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Problem of Age and Jurisdiction in the
Juvenile Court
A SuRVEY
All states have either separate juvenile courts, or essentially a
juvenile court procedure in other courts. However, the juvenile court
concept in the United States varies greatly from one state to another.
Notwithstanding this diversity, juvenile courts are confronted with
many common problems. Because all of the statutes make juvenile
delinquency jurisdiction dependent upon the age of the accused,' the
problem of the age at which a person should be treated as a juvenile
delinquent, rather than as as adult, is important both because it
constitutes a problem within the juvenile court movement and because
it extends to, and cuts across, several of the other common problems
of juvenile courts 2 Furthermore, the age standard adopted by the
legislatures is significant as a statement of policy. It may denote
incapacity to commit a crime. 3 For example, if a juvenile court is
given exclusive jurisdiction of all children under age sixteen, the
child under sixteen may be regarded as incapable of committing a
crime. His acts in violation of law would constitute delinquency and
not be classified as a crime. Further, the age standard may indicate
potential for rehabilitation.4 For instance, if a juvenile court has
jurisdiction over children eighteen or under, children eighteen or
under are viewed as likely to benefit from the special treatment
afforded by the juvenile court. Even if the age standard of the statute
does not indicate potential for rehabilitation, it may call attention to
the desirability of children of certain ages being segregated from
adult criminals.5 Finally, the age standard may denote when a child
is thought to be "mature,"6 or may be only declaring that children
below or between certain ages should 7be given a "first chance" before
being subjected to the criminal court.
I. PROBLEM OF AGE AND JURISDICTION:

1. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-242 (Supp. 1965).
2. For discussion of the manifold problems currently confronting the juvenile court,

see Gleuck, Some 'Unfinished Business' In the Management of Juvenile Delinquency, 15
SYtAcusE L. REv. 628, 629-30 (1964).

3. See text at note 13 infra.
4. For discussion of rehabilitative aims, see Herman, Scope and Purposes of Juvenile

Court Jurisdiction,48 J. Crum. L., C & P.S. 590, 604 (1958).
5. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-259 (Supp. 1965).
6. See Lopez-Rey, Juvenile Delinquency, Maladjustment and Maturity, 51 J. CBim. L.,

C &P.S. 34 (1960).
7. See In re Holmes, 175 Pa. Super. 137, 103 A.2d 454 (1954), aff'd, 379 Pa. 599, 109

A.2d 523, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973, where Judge Musmanno; dissenting, in speiking
of the juvenile courts, says: "It has -undoubtedly saved countless children from a life
of crime .

. .

. Instead of citing the case of Shelley's children, I would refer to the
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The focus of inquiry of this note is on the status of the law in the
United States regarding the age at which the juvenile court has
jurisdiction over delinquent children. Part I is a general survey of
"the law" in the United States in light of the historical bases of the
court. Part II is a detailed examination of one aspect of the problem
of age and jurisdiction-the provisions by which the juvenile court can
waive its jurisdiction and transfer the child to the criminal court. It is
the outgrowth of a limited field study made to see the actual operation
and implications of the waiver provisions in a particular setting.
Tennessee and the Metropolitan Juvenile Court of Nashville were
selected as the state and court because of ready access to material,
but the remarks as to Tennessee courts and their operation are assumed
illustrative or representative of other courts in other states. This note
attempts to arrive at some general conclusions as to the role of the
juvenile court in the United States.
A. Legal Roots of the Juvenile Court
Although the juvenile court is a creature of the legislature, it has
legal roots that are deeply embedded in English jurisprudence. 8 These
are found in the treatment given to children by the English courts
through the application of common law and equity doctrines for the
protection of innocence and dependency.
One of the legal roots of the juvenile courts is a principle of equity
or chancery, known as parens patriae,which originated because of the
inflexibility of the common law and its failure to provide adequate
remedies in deserving cases. 9 Through this system of equity, the king
acted as parens patriae, or as "father of his country," in exercising
his power of guardianship over the persons and property of minors,
who are considered wards of the state and, as such, entitled to
protection.' 0 Under the change of government from a monarchy to
a republic, as in the United States, the functions of parens patriae did
not cease to exist; instead, the authority passed from the king to the
government of the state or sovereign people, and it could be either
exercised by the legislature or delegated by the legislature to other
writings of Charles Dickens (particularly Oliver Twist) in which the sheer brutality
in treatment of unfortunate children makes one truly wonder at the contents of the
hearts of both judges and civil administrators in the 'good old days."' Id. at 628-29,
109 A.2d at 536.
8. Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. Rav. 364 (1937).
For criticism of the application of parens patriae to children except where custody is
involved, see Rappeport, Determination of Delinquency in the Juvenile Court: A
Suggested Approach, 1958 WAsU. U.L.Q. 123, 124.
9. 2 STORy, EQu=I JuBIsPRUDENCE § 1333 (8th ed. 1861).
10. Id. § 1328. An explanation given is that the king was bound by the law of
common right to defend his subjects and their property. Since infants could not
defend themselves, the king had to protect them.
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functionaries." Although originally equity had been used chiefly to
protect the dependent or neglected with property interests, its action
prefigured the protective intervention of the state through the instrumentality of the juvenile court in cases of delinquency. 2
The other legal root of the juvenile court is the presumption of
innocence thrown about children by the common law. At common
law a child under the age of seven is conclusively presumed incapable
of entertaining a criminal intent, and therefore, of committing a
crime. 13 Between the ages of seven and fourteen incapacity is
presumed, but the presumption may be rebutted by a showing that
the child knew the nature and wrongfulness of the conduct. 14 After
the age of fourteen, the child is treated as fully responsible for his
5
actions.1
The harshness of the criminal law toward children, even with the
presumption operating to their benefit, is shown in the administration
of criminal laws of early England. Many children were executed by
hanging or decapitation for comparatively trivial offenses. 6 As for
more serious offenses, Blackstone records that a girl of thirteen was
burned for killing her mistress, a boy of ten was hanged for killing
his companion, and a boy of eight was hanged for arson. 17 Further, he
tells of a boy of ten being convicted and hanged since sparing the
boy on account of his age might have endangered the public by
propagating the notion that children might commit atrocious crimes
8
with impunity.'
The presumption of innocence has been attacked on two grounds.
First, the courts find it difficult to decide how they should apply the
presumption and also differ as to the quantum of proof required to
show a guilty intention. 19 Second, where the presumption is strictly
honored, many prosecutions are not brought because guilty intention
cannot be proved; conversely, some of the prosecutions that are
11. Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S.W. 131 (1917).
12. See People v. Labrenz, 411 III. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
13. See Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457 (1886).
14. 4 BLACKSTONE, CoMMnrAREs 23 (2d ed. rev. 1872). See also TAFr, CIMINOLoc 559 (1945). "When concerned with children between the ages of seven and
fourteen, the court would investigate largely in terms of the nature of the act, whether
or not a particular child had a 'guilty mind'-such mens rea being requisite to full
responsibility."
15. See MODEL PEA. CODE § 4.10 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957), for a more complete
examination of the operations of the common law presumption.

16. 1 WHArTON,

CRIMINr

LAw 478 (12th ed. 1932).

17. Br.ACKSoN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 22-23.
18. Id. at 23.
19. Report of The Committee On Children and Young Persons 36, presented to
Parliament in 1960 with Viscount Ingleby as chairman. [hereinafter cited as Ingleby
Report].
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brought fail for lack of such proof.20 The difficulty arises from the
principles of criminal law being worked out and expressed in terms
of right and wrong. These principles have proved difficult to apply to
children. 2,
During most of the nineteenth century in the United States, child
and adult offenders were treated similarly although intermittent steps
were taken regarding their separate confinement.22 As of 1957, the
common law rule regarding the criminal responsibility of children was
still the law in a majority of jurisdictions, either by statute or case
law.23 However, by the turn of the century modern concepts had
begun to take form which embodied an upward movement in a
child's age of criminal responsibility. This movement was prompted
by the increase in the complexity of social relationships, the growth
of humanitarianism, and the rise of the social sciences. 24 The conception of a particular age giving a dividing line between "getting off"
and suffering was essential to the common law.25 Under the common
law an exemption was a complete defense and, thus, there were no
further steps that a court could take even though a child might be
in need of care and protection.
B. The FirstJuvenile Court
Introduction of the juvenile court represented a significant departure
from traditional judicial procedure by shifting emphasis from retributive justice and criminal court procedure to that of rehabilitation,
protection, and informality.26
The first tribunal created to deal specifically with the problems of
juvenile delinquency was established in Chicago in 1899, the Juvenile
Court of Cook County.27 Certain facts about this first court furnish
a perspective from which to view the juvenile court movement.2 8
A juvenile delinquent was defined as any child under the age of
seventeen years who had violated any law of the state, any law of
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 31.
22. See State v. Monahan, 15 NJ. 34, 104 A.2d 21, 22 (1954), for a brief historical
survey of the treatment of children in the criminal courts of the United States.
23. MODEL PEM. CODE, supra note 15. See also Thomas v. Commonwealth, 300 Ky.
480, 189 S.W.2d 686 (1945), where an eleven-year-old boy was convicted of raping
a five-year-old girl, and State v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 170, 60 N.W.2d 105 (1953), where
a fourteen-year-old boy was convicted of murder.
24. Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development and Some Major Problems, 51
J. Cawm. L., C & P.S. 493, 494 (1961).
25. Ingleby Report at 21.
26. Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice, Report pt. II, A Study
of the Administration of Juvenile Justice in California 1 (1960). [hereinafter cited as
Comm'n Report pt. II]. Cf. Rappeport, supra note 8, at 131.
27. ILL. LAws 1899, ch. 23, § 2.
28. For a good summary of the act, see Caldwell, supra note 24, at 495.
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a city, or any village ordinance. 9 The law did not stipulate that
juvenile delinquents should not be punished; it provided that the
child should receive approximately the same care, custody, and
discipline that his parents should give to him.30 Similarly, the juvenile
court was to be a special court and not an administrative agency.3 '
Furthermore, the act provided that "This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purpose may be carried out .... " 2 Undoubtedly a basic premise of the act was that the juvenile court
would be better equipped than the criminal court to deal with the
juvenile violator.33 In other words, a primary objective of the juvenile
court was to take the child offender out of the criminal court and
protect them from the criminal procedure and its effects.3
Two fundamental changes in the handling of juvenile offenders
have been assigned to this first act.5 It raised the age below which
a child could not be a criminal from seven to sixteen and made an
allegedly delinquent child subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. Also, it placed the operation of the court under equity jurisdiction and thus extended the application of the principle of guardianship, which had been used to protect neglected and dependent children, to all children, including juvenile delinquents, who were in need
of protection by the state.
C. Requisite Age and PresentStatus of Juvenile Courts
Although there are approximately three thousand juvenile courts
in the United States, 36 one critic has remarked that "In well over
2000 counties . . . nobody has ever seen a well-staffed, modem
juvenile court in action."3 7 But a fact more basic to this study is
that even though all juvenile courts have jurisdiction over delinquent
acts, the juvenile court laws themselves differ with respect to the
age at which a child is subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
The laws of most states do not specify any lower age limit; they
merely provide that children under a certain age are subject to the
jurisdiction of the court. A lower age limit of ten is specified in
Texas, 38 apparently to indicate the minimum age at which a person
29.
30.
31.
32.

ILL. LAws 1899, ch. 23, § 9(a).
Caldwell, supra note 24, at 495.
ibid.
ILL. LA-ws 1899, ch. 23, § 21.

33. RuBnr, CRIME AND JuVENIL_

34.
35.
36.
37.
p. 31.

DELNQUENcY 47 (2d ed. 1961).

Id. at 49.
Caldwell, supra note 24, at 495-96.
Id. at 499.
Carr, Most Courts Have to be Substandard, 13 Fed. Prob., Sept. 1949, No. 3,

38. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 2338-1, §§ 3, 12 (Supp. 1965).
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is capable of committing a crime. 39 Setting a lower age limit has

been criticized on the ground that "[s]ince the interest and needs of
the child, not criminal guilt for a particular offense, are the focal con-

sideration of the juvenile court program," 40 children excluded because
of sub-criminal age do not become "recipients of the valuable corrective and preventive treatment afforded by the system."41
All states, however, impose an upper age limit. Most states make
eighteen the upper age limit,

although some states set the limit at

39. Bogatto & Sewell, Age and Related JurisdictionalProblems of the Juvenile Courts,
36 TEXAS L. REv. 323, 325 (1958).
40. Id. at 338.
41. Ibid.
42. A recent article asserts that three-fourth of the states make eighteen the upper
age limit. Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Transfer of Cases Between juvenile and Criminal Courts, 8 CraUNE & DELINQUENCY 3,
4 (1962). For a collection of the statutes as of 1958, see SUSSMAN, LAW OF JUVENiLE
DELINQUENCY

(1959).

The following list was prepared by Mrs. Alice B. Freer, a program analyst in the
Office of the Director of the Division of Juvenile Delinquency Service of the Children's
Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as of February, 1965:
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland (Montgomery County)

Waiver Age
14
None stated
No Waiver
None stated
16
No Waiver
Under 16
16
16
14
15
Under 18
16
Any case
15
No Waiver
M16, F 18
16
No Waiver
Any juvenile
16-18

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

14-17
15
14
13
14
16
No Waiver
16
None stated
16-17
14

JurisdictionAge
16
18
18
18
Minor (21)
18
16
18
18
17
17
18
18
17M, 18F
18
18
M16, F18
18
17
17
18 (except Baltimore
which is 16)
17
17 (17-19)
18
18
17
18 (21)
18
18
18
18
18
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sixteen 43 or seventeen" and a few place it as high as twenty-one.4 5
Some of the factors which influence the states in setting their age limit
are disclosed in a recent study of the California juvenile courts.46
The study concluded that "The older the child the larger is the
proportion of his age group represented among referrals" and that
"most juveniles referred to probation departments for delinquent
behavior are sixteen years of age or older."47 The study reveals that
the fourteen-year-old minors comprised less than twelve per cent of
referrals, fifteen-year-old children comprised over eighteen per cent
of the referrals, and sixteen-year-old and seventeen-year-old minors
48 Of
each accounted for about twenty-one per cent of the referrals.
these referrals, fifty-eight per cent were charged with specific criminal
offenses, with theft, burglary, and auto theft comprising seventy
per cent of this group.49 Assault, robbery and homicide constituted
only eight per cent of the fifty-eight per cent total.5 0 Thus, only a
small group of the referrals have allegedly committed serious bodily
offenses.
The advocates of a reduction in age limits point to "mollycoddling
and leniency in the juvenile court,"51 while the proponents of the
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
43. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13,

No Waiver
14
14
Any age
None stated
16
14
16
Any child
None stated
16
No Waiver
14
No Waiver
14
None stated
16
16
No waiver
§ 350 (1959).

16
16
18
18
18F, 16M
18
18
18
17
18
18
M17, F18
18
16
18
18
18
18
18

44. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (1961).
45. E.g., CAL. W=LArE & INST'NS § 600 (Deering 1961).

46. The study is composed of two parts: Governor's Special Study Commission on
Juvenile Justice, Report pt. I, Recommendations for Changes in California's Juvenile
Court Law (1960). [hereinafter cited as Comm'n Report pt. I]; Comm'n Report pt. II.
See note 26 supra.
47. Comm'n Report pt. II, at 94.
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 34-35.
50. Id. at 35.
51. Rector, An Age of Reason for the Juvenile Court, 8 CHmmE & DELINQUENCY 1
(1962).
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court counter that often a child receives a more severe treatment in the
juvenile court than in the criminal court since the criminal court
very often imposes only a fine or fails to commit a child for as long
a period of time as the juvenile court might.52 Despite the conclusion
of the study indicating that there is a correlation between increased
age of offender and increased number of referrals, 53 a significantn4 fact,
indeed, is that no state has lowered its age limit since 1923.
In a few states the upper age limit differs according to the sex of
the child. Kansas, until 1965, limited its jurisdiction in delinquency
cases to boys below sixteen while girls eighteen or under were subject
to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 5 Distinctions based on sex
have been criticized especially where the age limit for girls is lower
than the age limit for boys.56 A critic of the recently repealed Kansas
statute has remarked that "the use of two entirely different procedures
and laws for reprimanding different members of a group, when the
distinction is drawn solely on the fact of age, causes one to question
the sagacity of the statute."57
At this point, a fundamental limitation on the juvenile court's
power should be emphasized. The juvenile court can exert its power
over the offender only during his minority, and the statutes so provide.58 For it to purport to direct action over an individual beyond
his minority would seem to be unconstitutional since the rationale
used for the court's constitutional authority is that it is acting in the
non-punitive capacity of parens patriae.59 A power to institutionalize
for longer than minority would constitute a criminal punishment.
Recognizing the nature of the proceedings in the juvenile court, such
exertion of power would, doubtless, be constitutionally prohibited.60
Notwithstanding the controversy and discussion as to the age limit
for the court's jurisdiction, only the exceptional state statute bestows
exclusive jurisdiction of all juveniles, regardless of the offense charged,
52. ibid.

53. See statistics in text at note 48 supra.
54. Comment, 10 KAN.L. REv. 586, 588 (1962).
55. KAN. LAws 1957, ch. 256, § 6. The age differentiation according to sex was
repealed by KAN.LAws 1965, ch. 278, § 2. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-806(c) (Supp.

1965).

56. "[Girls of this age bracket are usually much more mature than boys and
hence it would seem boys from 16 to 18 are much more in need or at least as much
in need of the help and understanding of the juvenile court as girls of this age."
Comment, 10 KAN. L. Ruv. 586, 588 (1962).
57. Comment, 6 KAN. L. R1v. 347, 349 (1958).
58. See, e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 37-263 (Supp. 1965).
59. See Petition of Morin, 95 N.H. 518, 68 A.2d 668 (1949).
60. "The act in question is designed to permit the exercise of the powers of the
state as 'parens patriae,' for the purpose of rehabilitating minor children, and not of
punishing them for the commission of a crime." Id. at 520, 68 A.2d at 670.
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on the juvenile court. 61 Virtually all states provide for trial in the
criminal courts in some circumstances. Moreover, there appear to
be at least four modes of allocating jurisdiction between the juvenile
court and the criminal court.6
First, the statute may exempt young juveniles from criminal
jurisdiction for all crimes while providing for criminal court jurisdiction for the older group for certain categories of offenses. Montana
defines a child as "a person less than eighteen years of age,"63 but
provides that:
a child over the age of sixteen (16) years who commits or attempts to
commit murder, manslaughter, rape . . . arson in the first and second
degree, assault in the second degree, assault in the first degree, robbery,
first or second degree burglary while having in his possession a deadly

weapon, and carrying a deadly weapon or weapons with intent to assault,
shall not be proceeded against as a juvenile delinquent but shall be prose64
cuted in the criminal court.

The courts have construed the statute as providing that children under
the age of sixteen may never be tried for a law violation in the
criminal court as they are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.65 The statute has been criticized for providing for a
categoric, mandatory transfer, with the seriousness of the offense as
66
the only criterion.
A second common mode is to provide for original and exclusive
jurisdiction for all juvenile court ages but to authorize the juvenile
court to waive jurisdiction in all or certain cases. The Maryland statute
provides that "the judge shall have [an] . . . original, exclusive jurisdiction concerning any child who is . . . delinquent," 67 but that

"[i]f any such child is charged with the commission of an act or
acts which would amount to a misdemeanor or felony if committed
by an adult, the judge, after full investigation, may in his discretion
waive jurisdiction and order such child held for action under the
regular procedure that would follow if such act or acts had been
commited by an adult."68 The courts, have however, held that the
juvenile can be held as an accomplice even though he cannot be
61. Texas has such a statute. See TEx. REv. Crv.

1965).

STAT.

art. 2338-1, §§ 3, 5 (Supp.

62. PAULSEN & KADISH, CASES ON CIMINAL LAW AND ITS PRocESsES 103 (1962).
63. MONT. Bxv. CODES ANN. § 10-602 (Supp. 1963).
64. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-602 (Supp. 1963).

65. State ex rel. Dahl v. District Court, 134 Mont. 395, 333 P.2d 495 (1958).
66. Geis, Publication of Names of Juvenile Felons, 23 MONT. L. Pv. 141, 142

(1962).
67. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 53 (Supp. 1964).
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 54 (Supp. 1964).
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charged with
the substantive crime unless the juvenile court waives
69
jurisdiction.

A third common mode of treatment is to grant the criminal courts
jurisdiction concurrent with the juvenile court over all juveniles or
over certain offenses with the criminal court having power to assert
or waive jurisdiction. While the Arizona statute provides that the
juvenile court "shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings and matters affecting . .. delinquent children, or children

accused of crime under the age of eighteen years,"70 the Arizona
Supreme Court has held that suspension of criminal proceedings
against a child under eighteen is discretionary with the trial judge
since juvenile law affects the treatment and not the capacity of the
offender.71 However, the juvenile court has the power both to refuse
to suspend criminal prosecution and to enter its order permitting
criminal prosecution to proceed.72 The result seems to be concurrent
jurisdiction by the two courts. Practice under
such a system has
73
been described as a "labyrinth of confusion."

The fourth method is to grant the criminal courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain offenses. The Tennessee statute provides that:
If... the judge of the juvenile court shall conclude that there is probable
cause to believe that the child has been guilty of the crime of rape ...
or murder in first degree or robbery by use of a deadly weapon, the court

shall at once dismiss said cause and assume no further jurisdiction thereof
than to remand said child .7. 4 .to be dealt with for his alleged offense, as
provided in the criminal laws.

Evidently, before 1965, any child in Tennessee under sixteen who
committed murder or rape had to be tried in the criminal courts75

although Tennessee, purportedly, still recognized the common law
presumptions of children seven and fourteen years of age. 6
A recent California statute may be examined as illustrative of the
trend for juvenile court statutes in the future.77 The revision of the
California juvenile court law in 1961 was based largely upon the
recommendations of a Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice
69. Haniday v. State, 228 Md. 593, 182 A.2d 40 (1962).
70. Amuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-202 (1956).
71. Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931).
72. State v. Henderson, 34 Ariz. 430, 272 Pac. 97 (1928).
73. Molloy, Juvenile Court,4 Aruz. L. REV. 1 (1962).
74. TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 37-265 (Supp. 1965).
75. See discussion in Greene v. State, 210 Tenn. 276, 358 S.W.2d 306 (1962). In
1965, a proviso was added to the statute to the effect that if the child is under the
age of fourteen (14) years, the juvenile court judge need not remand to the criminal
court. TENNu. ACrs 1965, ch. 131, § 1.
76. See Juvenile Court v. Humphry, 139 Tenn. 549, S.W. 771 (1918).
77. For a discussion of the California statutes, see Note, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 421
(1963).
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which convened in 1957 and issued its final report in 1960."8 The
juvenile court has jurisdiction of youths under twenty-one years 7of9
age. It has exclusive jurisdiction over all minors under sixteen,
original jurisdiction over minors sixteen to eighteen, 80 and jurisdiction
concurrent with the criminal court over minors eighteen to twentyone." The statute has been praised for its consistency with the
presumption that all young people who have run afoul of the law
can be rehabilitated if properly treated.82 This statute might be
contrasted with the even more recent New York Family Court Act
which provides generally for original exclusive jurisdiction over
juvenile delinquents only up to age sixteen.83 However, a report
accompanying the revision stated the age sixteen to be only a tentative
inclusion.a4
Regardless of the statutory prescriptions, the courts typically have
shown an eagerness to carve exceptions into exclusive juvenile court
jurisdiction or to widen the scope of legislatively created exceptions.
In carving out new exceptions to exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction
bestowed by the legislature, two techniques have been utilized most
often.15 The courts have held grants of exclusive jurisdiction to the
juvenile courts to be unconstitutional under state constitutions, and,
second, by a process of construction, often tortured, have concluded
that the legislature could not have intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction.
The constitutional method can be illustrated by developments in
Georgia. The Georgia juvenile court law explicitly conferred original
exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court in all cases involving
offenders under seventeen years of age, with power to waive jurisdiction. 6 However, using a provision in the Georgia Constitution
stating that the "superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction ...
in criminal cases where the offender is subjected to loss of life or
confinement in the penitentiary,"87 the court held, in Jackson v.
Balkcom,8 that exclusive original jurisdiction in the juvenile court
78. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
79. CAL.WELFARE & INmT'Ns § 600-02 (Deering 1961).
80. CAL.WE FA E & INsT'Ns § 604 (Deering 1961).
81. CAL. W FARE & INST'NS § 607 (Deering 1961).
82. Note, supra note 77, at 423.
83. N.Y. F my CT.AcT §§ 712-13 (McKinney 1963).
84. N.Y. FAmm.y CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney 1963), at comments accompanying.
For the report, see New York Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization,
VII, Young Offenders and Court Reorganization (1963).
85. Herman, Scope and Purposes of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 48 J. Ckni. L.,

C. &P.S. 590, 602 (1958).
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2408 (1959).
87. GA. CONST. art. 6, § 4.
88. 210 Ga. 412, 80 S.E.2d 319 (1954).
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constituted an unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive jurisdiction
of the criminal court in certain criminal cases. Thus, in Georgia, a
sixteen-year-old boy has been convicted for murder,89 a negro boy
of sixteen sentenced to electrocution for rape of a white female,.9
and a fourteen year old convicted for manslaughter.91 Because of
the constitutional limitations, the juvenile court had discretionary
power to transfer jurisdiction to the criminal court in all cases where
a penitentiary sentence may be rendered, but no power to withhold
jurisdiction from the criminal court.
Courts utilizing the second technique have usually been confronted
with an ambiguous juvenile court statute,92 or with other statutory
provisions in conflict with the juvenile court code. 93 It has been
suggested, however, that the process of construction used by some
courts94 could be consistent only with hostility to the juvenile court
laws .
However, not all courts have been hostile to the juvenile courts.
More commonly, the juvenile court acts have been sustained as
constitutionally permissible. 95 Further, some state appellate courts
have looked with favor at legislative grants of exclusive jurisdiction
to the juvenile courts. Louisiana courts have held that where the
juvenile court statute gives the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction
over all but capital offenses, a criminal court does not have jurisdiction
on a murder indictment to convict for manslaughter. 96 New York
courts have held that where the juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction for all but capital cases, a felony-murder conviction cannot
be obtained since no independent felony existed due to the fact
that an independent felony was not a capital crime.97 Furthermore, a
New Jersey case, State v. Monahan,98 apparently overruled In Re
Mei9 9 which had held that fifteen-year-old could be convicted for
murder despite a statutory stipulation that a person under sixteen
was incapable of committing a crime.
89. Jones v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 689, 82 S.E.2d 657 (1954).
90. Jackson v. Balkcom, supra note 88.
91. Armstrong v. State, 90 Ga. App. 173, 82 S.E.2d 51 (1954).
92. See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 145 Neb. 750, 18 N.W.2d 101 (1945).
93. State v. Burnett, 179 N.C. 735, 102 S.E. 711 (1920).
94. Herman, supra note 85, at 602.
95. See, e.g., ex parte Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908) (not unlawful
interference with relation of parent and child); Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 Miss. 374,
57 So. 2d 267 (1952) (cruel and inhuman punishment); Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo.
722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931) (equal protection and due process); Mill v. Brown, 31
Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907) (special law).
96. State v. Bedford, 193 La. 104, 190 So. 347 (1939).
97. People v. Roper, 259 N.Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88 (1932).
98. 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954).
99. 122 N.J. Eq. 125, 192 AUt. 80 (1937).
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As a guide for legislative revision, the Standard Juvenile Court Act
Committee published its Revised Standard Act in 1959.100 The act
provides generally that "the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:

(1)

Concerning any child . . . prior to

having become eighteen years of age." 1 1 As an exception to its
exclusive jurisdiction, it provides that "in the case of a child sixteen
years of age or older" who has committed an act that would be a
felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may, in its discretion, certify the child to the criminal court after full hearing and
investigation. 102 Notably, the act explicitly states that "No child
under sixteen years of age at the time of commission of the act shall
be so certified."10 3 The Committee recognized the authorization of a

transfer as a necessity since some sixteen and seventeen year olds,
and some younger, have developed tendencies which render them
impervious to the average juvenile court. 1' 4 Of interest is that the
National Council of Juvenile Court Judges had recommended that
fourteen be the age specified for certification. 105 As indicated, such
a proposal was rejected.
The Commitee's proposed statute, in its entirety, has not elicited
vehement criticisim but one writer has taken issue with a feature of
the act. Professor Robert Caldwell maintains that the criminal court
should have original jurisdiction where a child sixteen years of age
or over is charged with serious felonies, having the authority to
transfer such cases to the juvenile court.' 6 He reasons that since
the criminal court is held responsible for the security of society
and is organized and administered especially for this purpose, it must
have this power if the criminal law is to remain operative and if
vigorous law enforcement is to be encouraged. Not to give the
criminal court the power and thus assent to vigorous law enforcement,
he suggests, "may lead the impressionable young to conclude that
fracturing someone's skull is no more immoral than fracturing his
bedroom window." 1' 7 Statistics which have pointed to a large and
increasing percentage of serious crimes being committed by young
people have influenced his decision to give the criminal court such
original jurisdiction.0 8
100. Standard Juvenile Court Act (1959), in 5 NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N J.
323-91 (1959). [hereinafter cited as Standard Act.]
101. Standard Act § 8.
102. Standard Act § 13.
103. Ibid.
104. Standard Act, comments accompanying § 13.
105. Ibid.
106. Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development and Some Major Problems, 51
J. Camt. L., C. & P.S. 493, 509 (1961).
107. Ibid.
108. For some recent statistics, see Hoover, Juvenile Delinquency or Youthful
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An answer to Professor Caldwell's proposal is that the juvenile court
should be uniquely organized to weigh the interests of society and
the interests of the individual child in making a decision. 10 9 The
juvenile court, as is the criminal court, is also responsible to society.
If the juvenile court is not so organized or does not adequately assume
its responsibility, only then should the criminal court have the
initial, original jurisdiction with power to waive.
In summary, in some states children up to a certain age are immune
from criminal prosecution. Apparently they are deemed incapable
of committing a crime. This immunity might also result from assuming that children up to a certain stage in their development are
potentially capable of being rehabilitated. In actuality, even if a
child is regarded as incapable of committing a crime, a conclusive
presumption does not operate to free him of all responsibility for his
actions. Being adjudicated a delinquent should not be equated with
"getting off." Supposedly, the delinquent receives individual treatment-be it harsh or be it mild. Setting an age limit for the court's
exclusive jurisdiction does impair the court's flexibility. However,
society has a stake in the venture which must be respected. But the
age standard that is established need not be an arbitrary determination. Various professional groups and informal study commissions
have concluded that age sixteen is the proper standard. In most of
the states, however, the juvenile court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over all children. The court has jurisdiction over specified
groups of children up to a certain age limit. A substantial majority
of the states set the age limit at age eighteen. The juveniles who
demonstrate an "unfitness" for reformation either when they appear
before the juvenile court or after treatment has begun, may be
criminally prosecuted. The legislature often prescribes the criteria for
determining "unfitness."
D. Special Problems
Before concluding this inquiry, two special facets of the problem
of age and jurisdiction in the juvenile court deserve brief comment.
The two are: (1) At what point of time is the age of the child determinative for purposes of ascertaining juvenile court jurisdiction?
(2) Does age refer only to chronological age, or can it refer to mental
Criminality?,15 SYRAcusE L. IEv. 660 (1964).
109. For a discussion of the procedure in the juvenile court, see PiocUnE
EVIDENCE iN

THE Juv.ENILE CouRT

AND

3 (1962), a publication of the National Council on

Crime and Delinquency. Two advantages which the juvenile court has over the criminal
court are: (1) the juvenile court's procedure is more flexible (2) the juvenile court

was established to mitigate some of the harsh effects emanating from criminal court
jurisdiction over children.

19661

NOTES

age? The second has received little attention in courts and legislatures but has generated discussion by a few writers.
Basically, two points of time have been used to determine if the
juvenile court has jurisdiction over the child-the age at the time of
the commission of the offense, 10 and the age at the time of the
trial."' There is a sharp conflict of authority as to which of these
should be conclusive, the determination of the problem apparently
depending upon the wording of the statutory provisions in the
various jurisdictions. Apparently a majority of the jurisdictions have
concluded that the time of the trial, rather than time of alleged
commission of the offense, controls." 2 Thus, usually a child who commits an offense while he is of juvenile age becomes amenable to
criminal prosecution if he is indicted after passing the maximum age
limit for jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
The principal justifications for requiring the age at time of trial to
be determinative are that one who committed a serious crime as a
juvenile but remained un-indicted until after the operation of juvenile3
jurisdiction had ceased might be allowed to escape with impunity,"
and that an adult, guilty of a crime committed as a juvenile, would not
be an appropriate subject for an initial application of juvenile protection and reformation." 4 One writer has observed that jurisdictions
that utilize the time of commission of the offense as a standard
exclude, by express terminology or judicial discretion, the more
serious crimes." 5 The most penetrating criticism of adopting this
standard is that it allows the purposes of juvenile legislation to be
frustrated by delays that eventually permit criminal6 prosecution while
eliminating the applicability of the juvenile act."
In contrast, the use of a standard based upon the age at the time
of the offense has been praised as necessary to implement the purposes
of the juvenile law.17 Such a criterion would avoid most, if not all,
of the problems concerning subsequent criminal prosecutions and
protestations of former jeopardy. Thus, a child who had been committed to a state training school for juvenile delinquency would not
be subject to a criminal prosecution for the same offense after his re110. N.Y. F~mmyv CouRT Act § 714 (McKinney 1963).
111. Trx. Bsv. Crv. STAT. art. 2338-1, § 12 (Supp. 1965). See Northern v. State,
152 Tex. Crim. 569, 216 S.W.2d 192 (1948).
112. 48 A.L.R. 2d 665, 696 (1954).
113. McLaren v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 31, 209 S.W. 669 (1919).
114. Bogatto & Sewell, Age and Related Jurisdictional Problems of the Juvenile
Courts, 36 TExAs L. REv. 323, 327 (1958).
115. Ibid.
116. See Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 222, 224-25, 188 S.W. 370, 371
(1916) ....
117. Id. at 225, 188 S.W. at 371.
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lease." 8 Likewise, a child who had been placed under juvenile
jurisdiction would not become subject to criminal prosecution after
he had passed the maximum age limit for juvenile jurisdiction. The
Standard Juvenile Court Act apparently adopts the age at time of
the offense as controlling.119 However, such reasoning occasionally
might lead to an absurd application, as in Johnson v. State,'120 where
a twenty-six-year-old man who had been criminally convicted of a
homicide committed as a juvenile gained his release from prison
through writ of habeas corpus and had his case remanded to juvenile
court. But if discretion is vested in the juvenile court judge, the
possibility that an adult would be subject to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court is rendered unlikely.
The problem of chronological age versus mental age raises interesting possibilities. In State v. Schilling,121 the defendant was twentyeight years old, but had a mental age of eleven. He requested the
court to charge the jury that, if it found him to have a mental age
under twelve years, he would be presumed incapable of committing
a crime and a burden would be placed upon the state to show capacity
before they could convict him. Although the question presented by
this case is whether a "mental infant" of adult age should receive
the same treatment as an adult of normal mentality, the question
could be phrased as whether a "mental infant" should be subject
only to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.122 No juvenile court
statute at the present makes provision for such jurisdiction and apparently the likelihood of extending the jurisdiction to include such
situations has not been seriously considered. A major obstacle is
that psychologists and psychiatrists are not entirely in accord as to
the accuracy of mental tests administered to adults where the results
are given in mental ages.' 3 However, if the criminal law has been
built upon the theory that a person should be held criminally responsible only for acts which he intends to commit, a challenge to the
juvenile court might be imminent. 12 4
The defense would be composed of two elements: (1) establishing
a mental condition, and (2) translating the mental condition into a
118. See Deering v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 6,204 S.W.2d 983 (1947), where such
happened. But cf. Garza v. State, 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963), commented
on in 17 VAND.L. Ruv. 291 (1963).
119. Standard Act § 9.
120. 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942 (1955).
121. 95 N.J.L. 145, 112 Ad. 400 (1920).
122. Woodbridge, Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law, 87 U. PA. L.
REv. 426, 453 (1939). This article contains a good discussion of the problem. See
also GurrmAcHEm & WEmoFEN, Psyc-mamY Am THE LAW 426 (1952).
123. Woodbridge, supra note 122, at 454. For more recent statement, see Note,
43 CoNELL L. Q. 283, 284 (1952).
124. For the elements of a crime, see LunwIw, YOUTH AND THE LAW 4 (1955).
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mental age.325 The first element of the defense would utilize the
doctrine of partial responsibility, which rests upon the proposition
that a defendant should not be held responsible for a degree of crime
requiring as one of its elements a mental state that he is incapable of
achieving.'2 By using the doctrine of partial responsibility, the
defendant would not have to establish a mental condition sufficient to
secure acquittal, that is, by satisfying the tests of criminal responsibility.1 27 The defendant might be able to distinguish right from
wrong and still utilize the defense. 128 For the juvenile court to
acquire jurisdiction, however, the mental condition would have to
be equated with a mental age that would satisfy its "age- requirement.
Although the jurisdiction of the juvenile court might well extend to
"mental children," the difficulties inherent in such an extension may
forbid the juvenile court taking jurisdiction. 2 9
E. Conclusionas to Survey
The age limits which define the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
are of significance to the function of the court, ranging from a presumption of incapacity to commit a crime to a mere declaration
that children of certain ages should be given a "first chance." The
function of the juvenile court is to operate as a court, not as an
administrative agency. It must protect the child from the traumatic
experiences of a criminal trial and provide more flexible machinery
for balancing the interests of the child and the community in the light
of recent knowledge regarding human behavior. As a court it must
not only express the values of the society in which it functions but
also reinforce those values. In other words, the juvenile court may
both preach and practice rehabilitation, but it must recognize that
a child who is adjudged a delinquent has violated the moral values
of society. However, rehabilitation and the protection of society are
not necessarily inconsistent goals. To effectively function as a "legar'
court and to administer "equitable" relief, however, the juvenile
court must be a flexible instrument. In like manner, the jurisdictional
130
limits of the court must be flexible within reasonable limitations.
125. For difficulties, see GuTrmAcHER & WEiHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 122.
126. See LnrmANN & McINTnE,_ Tm MENTALLY DisABLP_ AND TnE LAw 355
(1961), for a full discussion of partial responsibility.
127. Some courts have seemingly considered low mentality on par with a legal test
for insanity. See, e.g,, State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 452, 108 AUt. 391, 392 (1919).
,NN& McINTYRE, op. cit. supranote 126, at 355.
128. Lnq
129. For difficulties of proof, see LrDmANN & McINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 126, at

336-52.
130. For recent appraisals of the juvenile court, see Allen, The Juvenile Court and
The Limits of Juvenile Justice, 11 WAYNE; L. REv. 676 (1965); Ketcham, Legal
Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 585 (1965); Paulsen, The
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iN TENNESSEE

Since the often-debated issue of the upper age level for juvenile
court jurisdiction is presented most sharply in relation to the child
over which jurisdiction may be waived,' 3 ' this chapter will explore
in some detail the waiver provisions of the juvenile court act in
The purpose of the study is not merely to analyze
Tennessee.'
and define Tennessee law, but, more importantly, to explore the
waiver provisions within the setting of a particular location. An
attempt will be made to identify the criteria which appear to be
involved in the exercise of authority to waive jurisdiction and the
implications of waiver for the theory of juvenile court procedure.
To get a clearer picture of the waiver process and problems implicit in its function, a limited field study was made. First, the
statistical records of Metropolitan Nashville Juvenile Court for a period
of several years were examined to ascertain the number and percentage of children over whom jurisdiction had been waived by
the juvenile court. Then the records of approximately fifty children
over whom jurisdiction had been waived by this court were closely
examined. An attempt was made to ascertain the disposition which
the criminal court made of some of those cases waived.
Before proceeding with the examination of the present Tennessee
statutes and their operation, perhaps a brief history of the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court in Tennessee will be useful.
A. A Brief History of Juvenile Courts in Tennessee
In 1911, an act was passed by the Tennessee legislature to "define
and regulate the treatment and control of... delinquent children."13 3
The upper age limit was the seventeenth birthday 134 with the further
proviso that:
any child who shall have committed a misdemeanor or felony, and who
shall have been found by the court to be a delinquent child . .. and who
shall thereafter be found by the court to be incorrigible and incapable of
reformation or dangerous to the welfare of the community may, in the
discretion of the court, be remanded.., and be tried for such crime.135
Delinquency, Neglect, and Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, Jusrcrc
FoR r=n CarrLn 44 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
131. See Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 8 CaMn & DELINQUENCY 3

(1962).
132. Unless referred to specifically, waiver will also be used to include the transfer
to criminal court. Actually there is a two stage process-waiver by the juvenile court
and then transfer to the criminal court.
133. TrNX. AcTS 1911, ch. 58, at 111.
134. TErN. Acrs 1911, ch. 58, § 1, at 111.
135. TENN. Acts 1911, ch. 58, § 9, at 117.
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Moreover, the statute further provided:
If, upon the investigation of a cause coming under the terms of this title,
the judge of the juvenile court shall conclude that there is probable cause to

believe that the child has been guilty of the crime of rape, murder in first
dismiss said
degree, or murder in the second degree, the court shall at once
36
cause ...to be dealt with ...as provided in criminal laws.'

In other words, the juvenile court had original jurisdiction over all
children up to age seventeen, with discretion to waive jurisdiction if
a delinquent of any age were found to be incorrigible. The juvenile
court judge was required to so waive and remand if he found probable
cause to believe the child had committed certain specified crimes. A
limiting provision on disposition was that the juvenile court could
137
commit a child for a period only up to his twenty-first birthday.
The courts themselves, however, added gloss to these statutory
provisions. The common law presumption as to the capacity of children to commit crimes was reaffirmed in Juvenile Court v. Humphrey,t1 but, evidently, the court held that the presumption need not
be recognized in the juvenile court since the proceedings are not
criminal. Wiggins v. State 39 concluded that the incorrigibility of a
child is a determination solely for the juvenile court and its finding
is binding upon the criminal court and subject to review only by
the ciruit court on certiorari. The finding as to "incorrigibility" was
res judicata and not subject to review by habeas corpus. However,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee had earlier held that where the
juvenile court is without jurisdiction, as where the child is probably
guilty of murder, the child is entitled upon habeas corpus to be
released for the custody of the juvenile court. 140 Construing the
4
provision for mandatory transfer, the court in Howland v. State' '

held that where murder is charged, a preliminary examination before
the juvenile court was not necessary to confer jurisdiction to the
criminal court.
The 1911 act was repealed in 1955.142 The 1955 act extended the
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S.W. 771 (1918). The court did not have to face the
issue squarely since the defendant was a seven-year-old charged with murder, and the
juvenile court was required to transfer to the criminal court upon the finding of

probable cause to commit murder.
139. 154 Tenn. 83, 289 S.W. 498 (1926).
140. Juvenile Court v. Humphrey, supra note 138.
141. 151 Tenn. 47, 268 S.W. 115 (1925). Thus every child charged with one of
the specified crimes did not have to appear before the juvenile court. However, if
during the investigation of a case, the juvenile court found probable cause, the
juvenile court was required to waive its jurisdiction.

142. TENN.Acrs 1955, ch. 177, at 670.
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upper age limit of the juvenile court's jurisdiction to the eighteenth

birthday. 43 The act provided for a mandatory transfer by the juvenile
court if it found probable cause that the child had committed rape
or murder, regardless of the child's age.1 However, the discretionary

waiver was limited to "incorrigibles" sixteen years of age or older
who had previously been declared delinquent and committed to a
in the custody
state institution, and who had committed a felony14while
5
of, or following the release from, the institution.
The waiver provisions, as of 1965, are more clearly expressed than
previously, but, at the same time, are more complex and detailed.

The juvenile court still has original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
offenses committed by persons under eighteen years of age except
for those for which it is authorized to waive jurisdiction. 146 The
juvenile court has discretion to waive its jurisdiction in four distinct
situations. 147 The only situation examined in any detail by this article
is that presented by section 37-264(1) (a) which primarily was added
in 1959:148
(1) The juvenile court after full investigation and hearing may order a
child held for prosecution and sentencing as an adult in the court which
would have jurisdiction if the child were an adult when:
(a) A child sixteen (16) years of age or over is alleged to have committed an act which would have been a felony if committed by an adult,
and a finding is made by the juvenile court that the child is not feebleminded or insane, is not reasonably susceptible to the corrective treatment
in any available institution or facility within the state designed for the
care and treatment of children or that the safety of the community requires the child to continue under restraint for a period extending beyond
his twenty-first birthday.

Section 37-265 provides, generally, that if the juvenile court, after
143. TENN. AcTs 1955, ch. 177, § 1. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-242 (Supp. 1965).
For criticism, see Juvenile Court of Davidson County, 1958 ANNUAL REPORT 1.
144. TEN. ACTs 1955, ch. 177, § 24, at 684.
145. TENN. Acts 1955, ch. 177, § 23, at 683-84. "That any child sixteen years
of age or older who has been declared a delinquent ... and who has been committed
to a state institution for the detention and education of delinquent children and who
shall, while, in the custody of said institution or following his release from such
institution, commit a felony, and who as the result of such felony, shall be found by
the court to be incorrigible and incapable of reformation or dangerous to the welfare
of the community may, in the discretion of the court, be remanded to the . . .
criminal court .. "
146. Greene v. State, 210 Tenn. 276, 358 S.W.2d 306 (1962).
147. TEN. CODE ANN. § 37-264 (Supp. 1965). Subsection (b) applies to children
sixteen years of age or older who commit acts while in the custody of a state institution
for delinquents. Subsection (b2) is applicable to children who have previously appeared before the juvenile court and have been declared incorrigible. Subsection (b3)
applies to children sixteen or older who while confined in a juvenile institution commit
an act of assault and battery with a deadly weapon.
148. See TENN.AcTs 1959, ch. 207, § 1, at 598.
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investigation, concludes there is probable cause that the child has
been guilty of rape, murder in first degree, or robbery by the use of
a deadly weapon, 149 the court must waive jurisdiction and remand to
the criminal court. However, if the child is under fourteen years of
age, the judge need not remand. 150 Moreover, if any child is remanded
to the criminal court and convicted of any lesser included offense, 151
he "shall" be remanded back to the juvenile court for disposition.
Before the juvenile court can waive its jurisdiction under section
37-264(1) (a), the following preliminary steps are necessary: (a) a
finding that the act would be a felony if committed by an adult; (b)
a full investigation; (c) a hearing; (d) a finding that the child is not
feeble-minded or insane; (e) a finding that the child is not reasonably
susceptible to the corrective treatment in any available institution or
facility within the state designed for the care and treatment of children
152
or that the safety of the community requires restraint of the child.
The preliminary steps under section 37-265 are: (a) investigation of
an act; (b) finding of probable cause that the child is guilty of rape,
murder in first degree or robbery by the use of a deadly weapon. But,
a child can still, doubtless, be tried in criminal court for these
particular crimes without the child ever appearing before the juvenile
court.

53

In the presentation that follows, it will be assumed that these

procedural steps are used by the court.M
B. Implicationsof Exercise of Waiver
The exercise of the authority to waive jurisdiction has significance
for the child involved, for juvenile court procedure and for the public.
In trying to see and understand the actual functioning of the waiver
process, three questions must be asked: (1) How many children are

affected and who is the typical child? (2) What are the criteria
involved, that is, what investigation is conducted and what is its

value? (3) What are the after-effects of waiver-what disposition
problems are presented?
1. Number Affected and Typical Child.-In the Davidson County
149. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (Supp. 1965).

The addition of robbery by the

use of a deadly weapon was made by TENN. AcTS 1965, ch. 132, § 1.
150. This provision was added by TENN. AcTS 1965, ch. 131, § 1.
151. For problems in determining what is a lesser included offense, see TENN. CoDE
ANN. § 40-2520 (Supp. 1965).
152. Cf., STANDARD AcT § 13. In the comments to § 13, the Children's Bureau's
position is presented. The Children's Bureau preference appears more similar to the
Tennessee statute.
153. See note 141 supra.
AcT § 19. The act contains a separate sentence devoted to the
154. See STAmiN
procedure to be used at the hearing. For a study of the actual procedure followed
in many juvenile courts, see Note, 79 HuIAv. L. REv. 775 (1966).
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Juvenile Court in 1963 there were 2,788 individual delinquent children brought before the court. 15 30.4 per cent, or 847, were seventeen
years of age. In 1962 there had been 2,499 individual delinquent
children before the court and 794 or 31.8 per cent were seventeen. 5
In 1963 there were 28 remanded to criminal court or approximately
1 per cent of the total.157 In 1962 there were 40 remanded to criminal
court or approximately 1.6 per cent of the total.'- 8 All of the children
remanded in both 1962 and 1963 were seventeen years old at time
of remand. Thus, 3.3 per cent of the seventeen year olds were
remanded in 1963 while approximately 5 per cent were remanded in
1962.
To obtain a clearer concept of the typical child over whom jurisdiction is waived, the records of such children for a period of 17
months were examined. 159 During this period, the juvenile court
remanded 49 children to the criminal court, all of whom were seventeen years of age and males. All had previously been before the
juvenile court; one had already appeared 18 times. No accurate
records were kept of the number of previous appearances, but in the
1963 statistics of the court it is noticed that approximately 6 per cent
of the seventeen year olds had appeared before the juvenile court
at least three times. 160 As already noted, 1 per cent of the seventeen
year olds then had been remanded to the criminal court. Most had
previously been committed to the state training schools with several
having been committed more than once and one having been committed five times.' 61 Some had previously committed more serious
155. Juvenile Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, 1963 ANNUAL REPonT 3.
[hereinafter cited as 1963 REPoRT].
156. Juvenile Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, 1962 ANNUAL REPoRT 3.
[hereinafter cited as 1962 REPoRT].
157. 1963 REPoRT 25.
158. 1962 REPoRT 20.
159. The records were examined of children over whom jurisdiction had been waived
from May 1, 1964 to November 1, 1965. The consent of Mr. Sam Davis Tatum,
Judge, Juvenile Court of Metropolitan Nashville, was obtained and is gratefully
acknowledged.
160. 1963 REPoRT 4.
Number of
Times in Court

Number of 17
Year Olds in Court

Per cent

79.1
670
1
14.8
125
2
3.5
30
3
1.3
11
4
1.0
8
5
.1
1
6
.2
2
7
161. Forty-three of the forty-nine had previously been committed to the state training
school. One had been committed before the age of twelve by special permission of
Commissioner of Correction.
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offenses than the offense for which they were remanded,'162 or had
previously been found guilty of the same offense. 163 Twenty-nine of
the forty-nine were before the court for either third degree burglary,
larceny of an auto or petit larceny. 164 Five were before the court for
armed robbery. In three cases probable cause was found that the
child had committed rape and he was remanded.
From these statistics certain general indications are discerned as
to the child most likely to be remanded. He is seventeen years of age,
white and has been before the court several times previously. Although the offense for which he is charged may be serious, it may
not be controlling as to whether he will be remanded. He will most
probably have been charged with committing a crime against property,
rather than against another person. He, doubtless, has previously
been committed to a state reformatory.
2. Criteriafor Waiver.-If these are the children remanded to the
criminal court, logical questions arise as to why they were remanded,
and on what basis. Answers to these questions should reveal the court's
criteria.
The legal standard to be satisfied before there can be waiver and
transfer under section 37-264 is different from the standard imposed
by section 37-265. Under section 37-264, only "incorrigible" children
can be waived and transferred. 165 "Incorrigible" was also the standard
required by the acts of 1911 and 1955. Apparently, however, the
word "incorrigible" was never defined in cases construing these acts. 66
162. E.g., one child had earlier been found guilty of armed robbery but was bound
over for petit larceny.
163. E.g., one child had previously been found guilty of armed robbery but later
bound over when he had again committed the same offense.
164.
Offense Before Court
Number of Children
3rd degree burglary
14
Armed robbery
5
Rape
3
1st degree burglary
1
2nd degree burglary
1
Loitering
1
Petit Larceny
7
Grand Larceny
4
Shoplifting
1
Assault with intent
1
Larceny of auto
8
Traffic
1
Assault and battery
2
165. In all of the records examined involving transfers under § 37-264, this term
and standard was used.
166. "Incorrigible" may have been defined as "incapable of reformation" under the
1955 Aar. See T.Nr. Acvs 1955, ch. 177, § 23. However, the word "incorrigible" was
also used independently of this phrase.
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The 1959 amendments 167 eliminated the word "incorrigible" from the
statute and instead used "is not reasonably susceptible to... corrective
treatment." 168 This latter phrase appears to comply with accepted
definitions of incorrigible. 169 In contrast, section 37-265 requires a
finding of probable cause that the child has committed certain felonies
before the juvenile court is deprived of jurisdiction. But neither
section requires a finding of guilt.
Initial inquiry was made as to what constitutes the "investigation,"
as required by statute, before the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction. 7 0 The file on the particular child, as found in the court's
records, was always found to contain: (1) the personal history of the
child, including his age, sex, address, names of parents, names and
numbers of brothers and sisters, and place of his parents' employment;
(2) the previous delinquency record of the child, including his previous appearances, the charge filed and the disposition; (3) statements
from both the child and the prosecutor as to the offense charged;
(4) the social history of the child; (5) the school record of the
child, including the grades completed in school, his attitude in school,
and whether he currently attended school; (6) the church record of
the child, including whether he belonged to a church and whether
he attended; (7) the planning and recommendations by the probation
officer assigned to the case, including an analysis of the child's attitude
and a recommendation of a particular disposition.' 7 ' Other items
occasionally found were an arresting officer's report and a report by
a psychiatrist. 72 Reports of mental condition were made in four of
the cases examined with the costs being charged as regular court
costs. 173 The juvenile court judge always made a finding as to "incorrigible" or "probable cause," and mailed the finding together with
the previous delinquency appearances to the district attorney general.
Generally, the scope of the investigation conducted appears adequate even though no statute specifies the contents or actual purpose
167. TENN. Acts 1959, ch. 207, § 1.
168. TmwN. CODE ANN. § 37-264 (Supp. 1965).
169. 20A WoRDs & PHRASES 378 (perm. ed. 1959).
170. "Investigation" is found in both § 37-264 and § 37-265. It has already been
pointed out that actually the criminal court may acquire jurisdiction of the child without
there first being an investigation by the juvenile court under § 37-265.
171. See Appendices A & B inf ra for illustrative cases.
172. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-501 (Supp. 1965), as to commitment to determine
mental retardation; TENN. CODE: ANN. § 33-701 (Supp. 1965), as to commitment to
mental hospital for observation and care. See Nashville Tennessean, Dec. 15, 1959,
p. 42, for announcement by Metropolitan Health Department that it will provide
psychiatric services to the juvenile court in the future.

173. See TnNx. CODE ANat. § 33-701 (Supp. 1965), for procedure to follow and the
charging of costs. Cf. TEN .CODE ANN. § 37-257 (Supp. 1965).
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of the investigation. The Standard Juvenile Court Act 74 requires
that the investigation cover "the circumstances of the offense or
complaint, the social history and present condition of the child and
family, and plans for the child's immediate care, as related to the
decree." A study commission has stated that the investigation should
include "in detair': (1) a statement of the present problem; (2)
previous problems; (3) family background; (4) developmental history
of the child; (5) agency contacts; (6) sources of information; (7)
resources available for treatment; and (8) plan for treatment. 175
However, the substance of the investigation should receive more stress
than the topics covered. In general, the actual content should depend
upon the type of case and the issue at stake. 176 The social study should
entail more than just securing a mass of facts and clinical reports.
There should be evaluation and interpretation of these facts, and
consideration should be given to the child's attitude toward the
delinquent act. 77 The sufficiency of the substance of the investigation
reports examined might be questioned. 7
Assuming that the judge has the results of a thorough investigation
before him, he must establish the criteria for transfer. The following
have been suggested as possible criteria: 79 (1) the judge should
base his decision upon both the age and the offense, not the age
alone; (2) he should base his decision upon the findings of the
investigation and the hearing, not on the question of guilt; (3) he
should ask whether the issues of contestable fact indicate that the
hearing in the juvenile court will be prolonged; (4) he should determine whether the offense, occurring after correctional treatment for
a previous offense, is serious; (5) he should ponder the "hopelessness"
of the case; (6) he should decide whether the child needs to be
punished for his attitude; (7) he should decide whether the advantage
in resources for treatment and public safety lie with the criminal
court rather than the juvenile court.
Applying these possible criteria to the statistics of the juvenile
174. STANDARD AcT § 23.

175. Legislative Council Committee, State of Tennessee, Final Report, Penal System
Study 197 (1960). [hereinafter cited as Penal Report].
176. Children's Bureau, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with Children 50 (1954).
177. Ibid.
178. For a short discussion of the social study, see Advisory Council of Judges of
National Probation and Parole Association, Guides for Juvenile Court Judges 49
(1957). The author is reluctant to express an opinion on the "investigations" since he
lacks the qualifications to do so. However, some of the investigations conducted
seemed to be skimpy, to say the least. The material presented in the appendices
represents probably two of the best files examined as far as contents of the social study
is concerned.
179. See Advisory Council of Judges, supra note 131, at 5.
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court previously presented, certain of the factors seem indeed significant. The age of the child is a controlling factor where the transfer
is discretionary. Not all seventeen-year-old boys are transferred, but
only seventeen-year-old boys are transferred. The judge apparently
uses the findings of the investigation and hearing before remanding
and does not make a finding as to guilt of the offense charged. However, the persuasiveness of the investigation was not determined.
That issues of contestable facts might require a prolonged hearing
in juvenile court does not appear significant since the issue is only
"incorrigible" or not, and not guilt. That the offense is serious is
obviously controlling when there is probable cause as to rape, first
degree murder or robbery with use of a dangerous weapon. The
seriousness of the offense coupled with prior correctional treatment
is important since all of the offenses were felonies and most of the
children had previously been committed to the reformatory. That
the case is hopeless may be a conclusion of the judge but not necessarily a factor in his decision. That the child needs to be punished
for his attitude seems important, especially since most of the children
remanded have been offenders over a period of years. That the
advantages in resources for treatment and public safety in the criminal
court outweigh the advantages for remaining in the juvenile court
are highly persuasive since the juvenile court declares the child
either not to be susceptible to its treatment1 80 or too dangerous not
to be restrained beyond his twenty-first birthday.' 81
Certain special problems of the waiver process merit at least brief
mention. Can the juvenile request waiver? The Tennessee Supreme
Court held under the 1911 Act that if the juvenile court is without
jurisdiction, the child is entitled to be released from custody.8 2
Whether the child can declare himself incorrigible so as to oust the
juvenile court of jurisdiction and then demand waiver has not been
presented in reported Tennessee cases. A juvenile court judge in
83
another state has stated that he does consider the child's preference.
A second question is whether the criminal court can refuse waiver.
Apparently the criminal court is bound by the juvenile court's
decision since the Tennessee Supreme Court held under the 1911 Act
that the criminal court was so bound. 8 4 Finally, if the juvenile court
waives its jurisdiction and remands, is the criminal court required
180. I.e., incorrigible.
181. This restraint applies to transfers both under § 37-264 and the reason for transfer
under § 37-265.
182. See Juvenile Court v. Humphrey, supra note 138.
183. Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency,

Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 8 CHmE & DE.UNQUrNCY 3,
5 (1962).
184. Supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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to report its disposition of the child to the juvenile court? The Tennessee statutes do not require the criminal court to report and
apparently they do not.es However, the Commissioner of Correction
is required to report to the committing court at least once a year 8on6
the progress of any child committed to the department of correction.
The child, however, does have a statutory remedy to challenge
the waiver. Section 37-273 provides that "any disposition" of a child
by the juvenile court may be appealed by "either party" to the
circuit court which shall hear the testimony of the witnesses and
try the case de novo. 8 7 This is a notable departure from the

statutory certiorari of the 1911 Act. 188 Section 37-273 by implication
also requires the juvenile judge to make a written finding of the fact
upon which his judgment was based. 189 However, the finding of fact
is apparently limited to declaring the child "incorrigible" or finding
"probable cause.' 190

3. Actual Implications of Waiver.-The key questions as to the
implications of waiver for the child are what happens to the child
who is transferred to the criminal court and how does the disposition
compare with similar cases in the juvenile court.
Bascially, the juvenile court, after finding the child delinquent, can
either place him on probation or commit him to an institution.' 91
Thus the court can continue the hearing from time to time while
the child is allowed to remain in his home or is placed in a suitable
family home, always being subject to the visitation of a probation
officer. The court can commit the child either to the department
of correction or to any institution or voluntary agency licensed under
the laws of the state to care for delinquent children. Section 37-262192
provides that when any child is committed to the department of
correction, the Commissioner is obligated to determine the most
appropriate facility for the rehabilitation of the child. Essentially,
185. In no file examined was there a report from the criminal court to the juvenile
court even though some of the juveniles had previously been bound over to the
criminal court.
186. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-262 (Supp. 1965).
187. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 37-273 (Supp. 1965). See Lokey v. Griffin, 45 Tenn.
App. 236, 322 S.W.2d 239 (1958).
188. Neither can the child appeal directly to the supreme court. Norrod v. State, 201
Tenn. 577, 300 S.W.2d 926 (1957).
189. The statute does not expressly require a finding by the judge in every case.
For problems arising as to the findings of the juvenile judge in Alabama, see Stapler
v. State, 273 Ala. 358, 141 So. 2d 181 (1962); McLaughlin & McGee, Juvenile Court
Procedure,17 ALA. L. REv. 226, 235 (1965).
190. In the files examined, only a one or two sentence finding was made by the
judge.
191. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-259 (Supp. 1965).
192. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-262 (Supp. 1965).
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there are four institutions and a forestry camp to which the Commissioner can commit the delinquent.193 As provided under section
41-831, any delinquent may be committed to these institutions.
However, children under the age of twelve must either have committed a capital offense or have the express approval of the Commissioner of Correction before they can be so committed. Section
41-832 makes special provisions for the children committed to an
institution for the commission of a felony. It provides that the child
may be retained until his twenty-first birthday. At any time after his
eighteenth birthday however, he may be transferred to the penitentiary
if the superintendent finds him to be incorrigible and the Commissioner of Correction approves. However, if the minor is transferred
to the penitentiary, the authority of the warden is derived from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court and thus the warden cannot hold the
person after he reaches his twenty-first birthday. 194 Of course, two
fundamental limitations are imposed on all commitments by the
juvenile court. First, the juvenile court can commit only for an
indefinite period of time.19 5 Second, a child cannot be committed
by the juvenile court for a period extending beyond his twenty-first
196
birthday.
The disposition which the criminal court can make of the child
over whom the juvenile court has waived jurisdiction seems less than
clear from the statutes themselves. Prior to 1955, apparently all boys
under the age of eighteen who had been convicted of an offense
punishable by confinement in the penitentiary had first to be confined
in the training schools.'97 Incorrigibles, murderers and rapists, after
reaching age eighteen, could then be sent to the state penitentiary.91
However, these sections were repealed in 1955.99 Section 41-827211
now provides that the state vocational training schools are "for the
detention and education of children found to be delinquent." Section
41-832201 provides that:
Any child committed to such institution for an offense punishable by
193. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-284 (Supp. 1965), for authorization of State
Vocational Training School For White Boys and State Vocational Training School For
Colored Boys. For authorization as to girls, see § 41-825 as to white girls and § 41-826
as to colored girls. For comment on operations and facilities of the institutions, see
Penal Report 67-71, 115-35. The forestry camp was established in 1961. See TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-840 to -848 (Supp. 1965).
194. State v. Bomar, 210 Tenn. 249, 358 S.W.2d 295 (1962).
195. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-262 (Supp. 1965).
196. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-263 (Supp. 1965).

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See TENN. AcTs 1907, ch. 599, § 4, at 2025.
See TENN. AcTS 1907, ch. 599, § 5, at 2026.
TENN. AcTS 1955, ch. 127, §4.
T , . CODE ANN. § 41-827 (Supp. 1965).
TEN. CODE ANN. § 41-832 (Supp. 1965).
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confinement in the penitentiary may be retained in such institution until his
or her twenty-first birthday, or at any time after his or her eighteenth
birthday, when found to be incorrigible by the superintendent . . .may be
transferred to the penitentiary.

Whether the phrase-"any child committed to such institution for an
offense punishable by confinement in the penitentiary"-applies to
children sentenced by the criminal court as well as children committed
by the juvenile court is not clear from the statutes and has not
arisen in the cases. Section 37-265,202 dealing with children remanded
after a finding of probable cause, seems expressly to provide that
children may be committed to a juvenile institution by the criminal
court and at age eighteen be transferred to the penitentiary unless rehabilitated. At any rate, recently a sixteen-year-old boy was sentenced
by the criminal court for a term of twenty years in the state training
school after being found guilty of rape by the criminal court.20 3 Doubtless, children convicted in criminal court after being waived as
incorrigible under section 37-264 can also be committed to the
training schools by the criminal court, but children remanded under
either section 37-264 or section 37-265 can also be sentenced to the
state penitentiary, 204 the county workhouses0 5 or committed to county
or city reformatories. 206
Section 37-265, in itself, appears to have raised some disposition
problems. It provides that if the juvenile court remands to the criminal
court after finding probable cause for rape, first degree murder or
robbery by use of a deadly weapon, and the criminal court convicts
the child for a lesser included offense, the criminal court must then
remand to the juvenile court for disposition only. At least two
difficulties are presented by the section. What is a 'lesser included
offense"? Section 40-2050207 defines "lesser included offense" but
construing the statute may be a problem. 20 8 Second, the juvenile court
cannot commit a child for a period extending beyond his twenty-first
birthday and further can commit only for an indefinite period. What
202.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (Supp. 1965).
203. Nashville Tennessean, Dec. 4, 1965, p. 12. Jurisdiction was apparently waived

by the juvenile court under § 37-265.
204. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 41-206, 41-302, 41-304, 41-305 (Supp. 1965); see

also § 40-2707, cited in 25 TENN. L. REv. 366 (1958) as the indeterminate sentence
in Tennessee; Greene v. State, 210 Tenn. 276, 358 S.W.2d 306 (1962), where a fifteenyear-old boy had been sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary.
205. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1201 to -1236 (Supp. 1965). In most of the
files examined in the district attorney's office, most of the waived children bad been
committed to the workhouse.
206. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-401 to -456 (Supp. 1965).
207. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2050 (Supp. 1965).

208. See Greene v. State, supra note 204.
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should the juvenile court judge do?209
Thus, there is a difference between being committed by the juvenile
court and sentenced by the criminal court. The powers of the
juvenile court are restricted by the same statutes that create it.
Perhaps the establishment of a reformatory for juvenile offenders and
first offenders might at least eliminate the problem of finding the
210
proper place of confinement for these juveniles in the first instance.
C. Why Waiver?

If children are supposed to be protected by the juvenile court, one
may ask why the juvenile court waives its responsibility and adds to
the burden already imposed upon the criminal court.
Five basic reasons have been offered to explain the need for the
waiver provisions. 21 1 First, some young offenders are really not
"children." They have indicated by their actions and attitude that
"child" would be an erroneous and inaccurate label for them. Second,
certain cases are hopeless. Implicit in this assertion may be that if
treatment does not work, punishment will. Third, the juvenile court
may lack facilities to "treat" some children. But does this mean that
the criminal court has proper facilities? Fourth, the waiver provisions
are needed to protect the experiment-the juvenile court as an
experiment. Finally, perhaps the provisions indicate that society
demands vengeance for violations of its code and values.
Doubtless, some of the reasons offered might be denoted as factors
which lead to the enactment of the waiver provisions. Yet to try
to determine the force of their influence could lead to many possible
answers and thus to no definite conclusions. Perhaps inquiry into
the inferences that might be extracted from their actual operation
in, and effect upon, juvenile court procedure would be more beneficial
to the court and society.
In Tennessee, do they indicate that the juvenile court looks
primarily to commitment to institutions because probation services are
ineffective? The criminal court can commit for a longer period of time
than the juvenile court. In their actual operation in Tennessee, do
they indicate that the older child receives harsher treatment? Do
they indicate that the needs of the child are always the controlling
factors in the juvenile court or in the legislature? Do they indicate
that the juvenile court is to subordinate concern for the individual
in order to protect the community?
209. See Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 13, 1965, p. 8, where a judge was placed in
such a dilemma. The article did not state what the judge did.
210. See Penal Report 40.
211. Sargent & Gordon, Waiver Of Jurisdiction, 9 CnmrE & DELINQUENCy 121, 122
(1963).
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D. Conclusion
The waiver provisions produce a conflict between the ideal of the
juvenile court that the "best interests" of the child shall be protected
and the demand of society that society be protected. Perhaps in so
doing, they help define the true role of the juvenile court. The
juvenile court is a part of our legal system, a system which must
protect many interests of individuals and groups. The juvenile court
can do no less. Apparently, the United States Supreme Court in the
1965 term has adopted this view of the juvenile court 2 12 The waiver
provisions are, thus, a necessary adjunct of the powers of the juvenile
court judge. The individual judge determines their effectiveness-as
is true of the juvenile court itself.
C. WILLIAm R mEY
Appendix A
When Bobby was brought before the Juvenile Court he was seventeen years old,
white and charged with third degree burglary-breaking into a neighborhood grocery
store and stealing cigarettes, candy and possibly a billfold.213 He had completed the
ninth grade in school, but currently was not attending school.
Bobby's father is forty-five years old and employed as a truck driver. The probation
officer describes him as a weak disciplinarian. The mother is forty-four and a housewife. She is described by the probation officer as overly protective. Bobby has three
brothers. Joe is eighteen and handicapped. Ed is fifteen and has previously appeared
before the juvenile court. John is eleven. The family receives no welfare aid.
Bobby's attitude in school had been described by one of his former teachers as
fair, even though he did not enjoy mathematics. Bobby is not a member of a church
and does not attend.
Bobby made a statement to the probation officer. He does not deny breaking into
the store. His explanation is that he took some pills, probably his mother's sleeping
pills and went to bed. He awakened during the night and, unable to sleep, "wandered"

out of the house and suddenly realized he had broken into the store. The prosecuting
party claims that Bobby tore up his store looking for money. He says he wants to
prosecute so that the boy will receive help. Bobby has previously broken into the store.
This is Bobby's fourth appearance before the juvenile court. In 1960, at the age of
212. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). The Court states that:
"There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."
The defendant, Kent, had appeared before the District of Columbia Juvenile Court on
charges of housebreaking, robbery and rape. Proceeding under a discretionary waiver
statute requiring only a "full investigation" of the charges, the juvenile court judge
transferred Kent to the criminal court. The court of appeals affirmed. On petition of
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. As a condition to a valid waiver order, the
juvenile was entitled to a hearing including access by his counsel to the social records
and probation or similar reports which presumably were considered by the court, and to
a statement of reasons for the juvenile court's decision. The decision, doubtless, has
broad implications for the future operations of the juvenile court.
213. Appendices A and B contain summaries of the records of actual cases. The
cases are not presented as typical cases. Perhaps they represent the unusual case as
far as the records examined in this study. They do illustrate the difficulty of making a
decision to waive jurisdiction even when the judge has adequate, or near adequate,
evidence on which to make his decision.
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twelve, a delinquency petition was filed against him but the matter was settled
unofficially. In 1964, at the age of sixteen, he was charged with first degree and
third degree burglary-theft of a bicycle. He was found guilty and sent to Central
State Hospital for examination. His father paid the costs. On being released after a
further hearing, he was confined to the state training school for about four months.
In February of 1965 he was charged with three acts of third degree burglary and
found guilty. He was confined to the state training school for about six months. On
release, the officials described his improvement as "remarkable." Three weeks later, he
was charged with the present offense.
Two psychiatric reports are found in Bobby's file. At Central State Hospital in 1964,
he was found to be suffering "from an emotional affection-namely, adjustment reaction
of adolescence in a passive dependent personality causing him to commit anti-social
acts." He is stated to have a dull, normal intellect with a poor attention span, and
being hostile to authority. He was described as "relating good" away from adults. The
hospital concluded that he needed "male identification" and recommended that he be
sent to the state training school or placed in a proper foster home. A private
psychiatritst concluded in 1965 that Bobby had no psychosis-he was just nervous.
However, he was described as dissocial. No "medication" was prescribed.
The probation officer recommends that Bobby be sent to the state training school or
bound over to the criminal court.
On September 29, the juvenile court, after a hearing, waived jurisdiction and transferred Bobby to the criminal court.
Appendix B
When Sammy was brought before the juvenile court he was seventeen, white and
charged with grand larceny. He and three other boys, ages 15 and 17, had stolen a
truck and stripped it of its contents of cigarettes, cokes and candy.
Sammy's father is fifty-eight and works for a lumber company. His father can
neither read nor write, but wants his children to have the opportunities he was
denied. His mother is thirty-nine and is his father's second wife. She has completed
the third grade in school. Sammy has two brothers and a sister. John is sixteen and
retarded. Mack is ten and retarded. Judy is three months. The family receives no
welfare aid.
Sammy is not a member of a church and attends only occasionally. Sammy has
completed most of his school years at a special school. In 1959, a case study was
made by a social worker at the school. He was described as mentally retarded with
an I.Q. of 75. Further, he lacked self-confidence and was tense. He was embarrassed
because of his retarded brothers and was not working to his potential himself. His
home conditions were listed as bad.
In a statement to the probation officer, the boys admitted the offense. The owner
and prosecutor had left the keys in the truck, and they drove away with it.
This is Sammy's fifth appearance before the court. At the age of twelve, he was
charged for being a "run-a-way," but the matter was disposed of without a hearing.
At the age of fourteen he was charged with larceny of an automobile and received a
suspended sentence to the state training school. At the age of fifteen, he was charged
with violating the curfew law and third degree burglary. He and three other boys
were found guilty of stealing copper tubing from a warehouse. He was sent to the
state training school but released after a month on request of counsel retained by the
boy's father. On release, an official of the school stated that Sammy had caused
little trouble there, but predicted that Sammy would later get into more trouble.
Shortly thereafter he was charged with petit larcency but the matter was disposed of
without an official hearing. At the age of sixteen, he was charged with driving without
a license, reckless driving and loitering. He was paroled to his father and fined ten
dollars.
The probation officer recommends that Sammy be sent to the state training school.
On December 12, Sammy was transferred, after a hearing, to the criminal court. The
other boys were sent to the state training school.

